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SURVEY OF (MOSTLY OUTDATED AND OFTEN
INEFFECTIVE) LAWS AFFECTING WORK-RELATED
MONITORING
ROBERT SPRAGUE*
[Smartphones] are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important
feature of human anatomy. 1
The scope and variety of the types of surveillance that are possible today
are unprecedented in human history. This fact alone should give us
pause. 2

I. INTRODUCTION
We already know, or at least suspect, that the government uses our
online and mobile applications to surveil us. 3 As do businesses for their own
commercial purposes. 4 To what extent do employers monitor the activities
of their workers?
* J.D., M.B.A. Professor of Legal Studies in Business, University of Wyoming College of Business. The
author thanks César F. Rosado Marzán and Martin H. Malin for their invitation to present the contents of
this article at the 39th Annual Kenneth M. Piper Memorial Lecture in Labor Law hosted by the Institute
for Law and the Workplace and the Chicago-Kent College of Law, Chicago, Illinois, April 4, 2017.
1. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
2. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (2013).
3. See, e.g., Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, The 10 Biggest Revelations from Edward Snowden’s
Leaks, MASHABLE (June 5, 2014), mashable.com/2014/06/05/edward-snowden-revelations
[https://perma.cc/9TDN-6BPG]; Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access
for a Surveillance Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU OF N. CAL.: BLOG (Oct. 11,
2016), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access-surveillanceproduct-marketed-target [http://perma.cc/XHP6-EJ7P] (noting social media monitoring product
marketed to law enforcement); FISC Orders on Illegal Government Surveillance, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/foia/fisc-orders-illegal-government-surveillance [https://perma.cc/P4MUSN39] (last visited Dec. 13, 2016) (discussing Freedom of Information Act requests for information
related to email and telephone call surveillance at the National Security Agency).
4. See, e.g., Steven Englehardt & Arvind Narayanan, Online Tracking: A 1-Million-Site
Measurement and Analysis, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM SIGSAC CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER
AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 1388, 1397 (2016) (revealing tracking techniques used to
“fingerprint” web browsers and devices as users move from site to site, tracking them even when they
explicitly demand not to be tracked and take countermeasures to prevent the tracking); Alexander Tsesis,
The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 433, 433 (2014) (“Under current U.S. law, online businesses can track private users without their
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This article provides an overview of laws associated with work-related
monitoring, particularly related to electronic communications and other
forms of data monitoring. Part II focuses on workplace privacy and employer
monitoring, first briefly exploring why employers monitor employee
communications. Part II then reviews common law privacy protections as
applied to work-related electronic communications, followed by a review of
potential federal and state statutory protections that, on the surface, may
provide similar protections. In Part III, this article considers evolving
communications and monitoring platforms, namely smartphone GPS
applications and privacy implications of wellness programs. This article
concludes with an analysis of the state of worker privacy in the modern
American workplace, noting that what legal protections are available are
mostly outdated and extremely limited in scope.
The erosion of the demarcation between work and personal life was
noted by Justice Blackmun thirty years ago—“It is . . . all too true that the
workplace has become another home for most working Americans. . . . [T]he
tidy distinctions . . . between the workplace and professional affairs, on the
one hand, and personal possessions and private activities, on the other, do
not exist in reality.” 5—and has more recently been the subject of scholarly
comment. 6 Add to this the ubiquity of the smartphone 7 and the emergence

being aware of the extent to which websites monitor conduct, aggregate it with other personal details,
create marketing profiles, and sell the cumulative character sketches to third parties.”); Jeff Desjardins,
Is Your Favorite Website Spying on You?, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Mar. 28, 2017, 12:34 PM),
http://www.visualcapitalist.com/favorite-website-spying/ [http://perma.cc/KJZ4-EJRU]; see also
Richards, supra note 2, at 1937 (“Surveillance, it seems, is not just good politics, but also good
business.”).
5. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 739 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
6. See, e.g., Patricia Sánchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the
Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 64 (2012) (arguing that “boundary-crossing”
communications systems and devices provided by employers “blur the already elusive line between the
private and the public, the home and the workplace” for employees); Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a
Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act for the Electronic Monitoring of
Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 461, 469 (2012) (“Technology permits a ‘boundary-less’ workplace in
which employees work during non-work hours and while at home.” (footnote omitted)); Robert Sprague,
Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal Life and the Employment
Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 1 (2011) (arguing the dual-use nature of communications
services and devices for both work and personal uses causes the distinction between work and personal
use to become lost or, at a minimum, blurred).
7. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (“Today . . . it is no exaggeration to say that
many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital
record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”); see also City of Ontario
v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (“Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification.”).
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of wearable technologies in the workplace, 8 and we have the scenario for
real-time, continuous collection of personal data by employers.
Consider, for example, Myrna Arias’s experience with her employer,
Intermex Wire Transfer. Shortly after Arias was hired, Intermex instructed
its employees to download the Xora app to their smartphones. 9 After
determining that the Xora app contains a GPS function, Arias and other
employees asked whether Internex would be monitoring their movements
while off duty, 10 particularly since Arias and other employees were required
to keep their phones’ power on “‘24/7’ to answer phone calls from clients.” 11
Not only did Arias’s supervisor state that employees would be monitored
while off duty, the supervisor “bragged that he knew how fast [Arias] was
driving at specific moments ever since she had installed the app on her
phone.” 12 Arias sued Intermex for, inter alia, invasion of privacy after she
was “scolded” by her supervisor for de-installing the Xora app from her
smartphone and being fired a few weeks later. 13
II. WORKPLACE PRIVACY AND EMPLOYER MONITORING
Employers monitor employees’ behavior and communications for a
number of legitimate business reasons, including productivity, safety and
threat prevention, and liability prevention and compliance. 14 After all, a GPS
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Brown, The Fitbit Fault Line: Two Proposals to Protect Health and
Fitness Data at Work, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 5 (2016) (“Employers make key
decisions based on employees’ biometric data, collected from specialized devices like a Fitbit or the
health-related apps installed on mobile phones.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3) (2017) (allowing
employers to use incentives to encourage employees to participate in wellness programs). The EEOC
describes wellness programs as including health risk assessments as well as encouraging employees to
engage in physical activities such as walking or exercising. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 Appendix. See
generally infra Part III. B.
9. Complaint at 3, Arias v. Intermex Wire Transfer, LLC, No. 1:15-CV-01101 (E.D. Cal. Nov.
23, 2015), 2015 WL 2254833. Xora appears to be part of the StreetSmart workforce management software
distributed by ClickSoftware, which, in part, promises to “provide the location of every mobile employee
on a Google Map with detailed information such as arrival times, break status, the route driven and more.”
See StreetSmart, CLICKSOFTWARE,
https://www.clicksoftware.com/products/streetsmart/ [https://perma.cc/Y369-29R7] (last visited Jan. 16,
2017).
10. Complaint, supra note 9.
11. Id. at 3–4.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. Arias and Intermex subsequently settled the lawsuit. See Elizabeth Austermuehle,
Monitoring Your Employees Through GPS: What Is Legal, and What Are Best Practices?,
GREENSFELDER (Feb. 18, 2016, 2:13 PM), http://www.greensfelder.com/business-risk-managementblog/monitoring-your-employees-through-gps-what-is-legal-and-what-are-best-practices
[https://perma.cc/5JKY-6HQW].
14. See Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework
for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285 (2011) (proposing an employee-monitoring framework
that balances employer and employee interests with respect to business, liability-avoidance, and
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application installed on an employee’s smartphone can reveal that the
employee is in Las Vegas the day he called in sick (and the employer does
not have an office there). 15 More often than not, monitoring employee web
activity by the employer will probably reveal that many employees do waste
work time visiting web sites unrelated to work. 16
In certain circumstances, employers may even be legally compelled to
monitor workers. Hostile work environment jurisprudence is one such area. 17
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 18 and its companion case Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 19 offer employers a defense against a hostile
environment created by a supervisor (when no tangible employment action
is taken) if it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior. 20 This places greater pressure on employers to
monitor employee behavior. 21 And this duty to monitor may extend beyond
a hostile work environment. In Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 22 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Ellerth in holding that the
employer, Home Depot U.S.A., could potentially be civilly liable for a
supervisor murdering his subordinate because Home Depot granted the killer
the supervisory power, which he then abused. 23
investigatory purposes); see also Jessica K. Fink, In Defense of Snooping Employers, 16 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 551 (2014); Lee Michael Katz, Monitoring Employee Productivity: Proceed with Caution, SOC’Y
HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (June 1, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0615employee-monitoring.aspx [https://perma.cc/6J3Z-5SJK].
15. See Will Yakowicz, When Monitoring Your Employees Goes Horribly Wrong, INC. (July 6,
2015), https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/drones-catch-employees-having-sex-and-other-employeemonitoring-gone-wrong.html [http://perma.cc/4JRZ-DZ3Z].
16. See Ciocchetti, supra note 14, at 336.
17. See Fink, supra note 14, at 587–89.
18. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
19. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
20. Specifically, when no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages comprised of two necessary elements: “(a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 807.
21. See, e.g., Burlington, 524 U.S. at 770 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Sexual harassment is simply
not something that employers can wholly prevent without taking extraordinary measures—constant video
and audio surveillance, for example—that would revolutionize the workplace in a manner incompatible
with a free society.” (citation omitted)); Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 490, 513 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, J., dissenting), aff’d, 524 U.S. 742 (“It is facile to suggest that employers are quite capable
of monitoring a supervisor’s actions affecting the work environment. Large companies have thousands
of supervisory employees. Are they all to be put under video surveillance?”).
22. 852 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2017).
23. Id. at 650–51. The supervisor threatened to fire or reduce the subordinate’s hours if she did not
accompany him on a personal trip; the supervisor murdered the subordinate on that trip. Id. at 648. The
supervisor had a history of sexually harassing and verbally abusing his young female subordinates,
including his victim. And although he was ordered twice to attend anger management classes, he never
completed them and the employer never followed up to make sure he did. Id. at 647; see also Doe v. XYC
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But these duties to monitor do not necessarily give employers
unfettered rights to monitor employees, and particularly employees’
computer activities and electronic communications.
A. Common Law Right to Privacy in the Workplace
In the private realm, a person’s privacy is not invaded unless there has
been a highly offensive intrusion upon that person’s solitude or private
affairs. 24 In general, courts do not consider the workplace a secluded and
private area sufficient to provide a “zone of privacy.” 25 Even within a
privately-owned workplace, courts consider it more akin to a public place 26
than, say, one’s home, where privacy is most sacrosanct. 27 While courts have
indeed recognized that employees can have some degree of privacy in the

Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (“[A]n employer who is on notice that one
of its employees is using a workplace computer to access pornography, possibly child pornography, has
a duty to investigate the employee’s activities and to take prompt and effective action to stop the
unauthorized activity, lest it result in harm to innocent third-parties. No privacy interest of the employee
stands in the way of this duty on the part of the employer.”); cf. Muick v. Glenayre Elec., 280 F.3d 741,
743 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he abuse of access to workplace computers is so common (workers being prone
to use them as media of gossip, titillation, and other entertainment and distraction) that reserving a right
of inspection is so far from being unreasonable that the failure to do so might well be thought
irresponsible.”).
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2014) (applying this standard in the employment
context); infra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. In contrast, the government must obtain a warrant if
a search would infringe upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., Benn v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., No. 97-4403-CIV, 1999 WL 816811, at *8 (S.D. Fla.
July 21, 1999) (noting unique exceptions such as when an employee looks up a coworker’s skirt or when
an employee enters the ladies’ restroom and commits a battery upon a coworker). For public employers,
courts apply the Fourth Amendment-based reasonable expectation of privacy in a workplace setting. See,
e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987); Nelson v. Salem State Coll., 845 N.E.2d 338, 346
(Mass. 2006). However, Fourth Amendment protections do not directly apply to private-employer
monitoring. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure. . . effected by a private party on his own initiative.”);
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (finding that the Fourth Amendment “was not intended
to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies”); Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The
Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 85 (2004).
26. See, e.g., Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D. Nev. 1985) (finding employee had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in small, open shop room, particularly when employee had a loud
voice).
27. Polay v. McMahon, 10 N.E.3d 1122, 1127 (Mass. 2014) (“Nowhere are expectations of privacy
greater than in the home . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The sanctity of the home vis-à-vis
privacy has been a long-recognized doctrine in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (recognizing “the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life” as
protected from unwarranted government search and seizure).
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workplace, 28 it is also true that notice by the employer of monitoring can
often defeat any expectation of privacy by employees. 29
For example, in Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 30 the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that an employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in email communications sent to her attorney through a private,
password-protected, web-based email account, although the employee
accessed the account using her employer-provided laptop. 31 The court
concluded the employee had “plainly [taken] steps to protect the privacy of
those e-mails and shield them from her employer.” 32 Importantly, the court
also concluded that the employer’s electronic communications policy did not
address the use of personal, web-based email accounts accessed through
company equipment. 33 Stengart involved an employee’s communications
with her attorney and whether the attorney-client privilege should be
maintained. 34 Compare Stengart with Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co.,
which also involved an employee sending her attorney email messages using
the employer’s computer system. 35 In Holmes, however, the employer’s
policy clearly stated that employees using company computers to create or
28. See Muick, 280 F.3d at 743 (listing cases in which courts have held employees had a right to
privacy in papers stored in their offices).
29. See id. (listing cases in which courts have held that providing notice of monitoring defeated
expectations of privacy); see also Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 633 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (“[A]
party’s expectation of privacy in messages sent and received on company equipment or over a company
network hinge on a variety of factors, including whether or not the company has an applicable policy on
point.”; applying Illinois Eavesdropping Statute, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-1(e) (2014)); Lothar
Determann & Robert Sprague, Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in
Europe, Destroyed in the United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979 (2011) (arguing that while U.S.
employers can destroy actual expectations of privacy through the use of notices and consent forms, the
level of detail and specificity of such notices must increase when the intrusiveness of the surveillance
increases).
30. 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
31. Id. at 663.
32. Id.
33. Id. (“[The policy] does not address personal accounts at all. Nor does it warn employees that
the contents of e-mails sent via personal accounts can be forensically retrieved and read by the company.
Indeed, in acknowledging that occasional personal use of e-mail is permitted, the Policy created doubt
about whether those e-mails are company or private property.”). The court also distinguished the content
of the emails from the content at issue in Muick, 280 F.3d at 742–43, and Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d
1156, 1158 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005): “the e-mails are not illegal or inappropriate material stored
on [the employer’s] equipment, which might harm the company in some way.” Stengart, 990 A.2d at
663–64. In Muick, the employer had seized the employee’s employer-provided laptop in cooperation
with a criminal investigation of child pornography. 280 F.3d at 742. “An employer has a legitimate
business interest in prohibiting certain computer uses that are likely to negatively impact the business or
workplace.” Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 662 (2009) (reviewing labor arbitration decisions governing the right to privacy
from employer monitoring).
34. 990 A.2d at 655.
35. 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047, 1051 (2011). The court never explicitly states, but does imply, that the
employee was using the employer’s email system to communicate with her lawyer.
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maintain personal information or messages “have no right of privacy with
respect to that information or message.” 36 The California Court of Appeals
concluded that by using the company’s computer to communicate with her
lawyer, knowing the communications violated company computer policy
and could be discovered by her employer due to company monitoring of
email usage, the employee’s communications were not privileged. 37
Courts do appear to respect individual expectations of privacy in
personal, password-protected accounts, 38 even when accessed from an
employer-provided computer 39 and the employee in question has configured
the account to pre-populate the account’s user name and password. 40
Restricting access alone is no absolute bar from an employer still viewing
personal information with impunity. Although the “third-party doctrine”
originates from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 41 it applies equally in the
36. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 1051–52 (analogizing the employee’s e-mails “to consulting her lawyer in her employer’s
conference room, in a loud voice, with the door open, so that any reasonable person would expect that
their discussion of her complaints about her employer would be overheard by him”).
38. See, e.g., Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 WL 6085437, at *7 (D.N.J.
July 25, 2008) (concluding employer violated employees’ expectation of privacy if it coerced an
employee to reveal the password required to access the web site used by employees to discuss working
conditions). But see Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420 (D.N.J. Sept.
25, 2009) (reporting that jury concluded employer did not violate plaintiffs’ common law right to
privacy).
39. See, e.g., Borchers v. Franciscan Tertiary Province of the Sacred Heart, Inc., 962 N.E.2d 29, 42
(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (concluding the employer accessing multiple email messages on plaintiff’s AOL
account, which employee had temporarily accessed through employer’s computer system, could be
actionable under the Stored Communications Act; see infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text).
40. See, e.g., Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding former employee “had a subjective belief that his personal e-mail accounts,
stored on third-party computer systems, protected (albeit ineffectively) by passwords, would be private”).
The court analogized the situation to one where if the former employee “had left a key to his house on
the front desk at [the employer], one could not reasonably argue that he was giving consent to whoever
found the key, to use it to enter his house and rummage through his belongings.” Id. at 561. In addition,
the court noted that there was nothing in the employer’s email policy to alert employees to the possibility
that their private email accounts could also be accessed and viewed by their employer. Id.
41. The third party doctrine is a Fourth Amendment doctrine originating with respect to law
enforcement’s ability to obtain records held by third parties. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.”), superseded by statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit.
XI, 92 Stat. 3641, 3697 (1978) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012)), as recognized
in SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44
(1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”), superseded by statute, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99508, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868–69 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012)) (requiring
government authorities to obtain a court order or permission of the user prior to recording telephone
numbers dialed), as recognized in Saldana v. Wyoming, 846 P.2d 604, 628 n.1 (Wyo. 1993). But see
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 37 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.D.C.
2015) (questioning “whether people can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata
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common law privacy context. Fundamentally, one generally cannot claim an
invasion of privacy against someone who has obtained highly personal or
private information from a third party. Deborah Ehling’s experience
exemplifies application of this doctrine in a private-employment setting.
Ehling, a nurse and paramedic, was fired by her employer, Monmouth-Ocean
Hospital Service Corporation (MONOC), after its management became
aware of certain information Ehling had posted on her personal Facebook
page. 42 Although Ehling had restricted access to her account, excluding
MONOC management, 43 her invasion of privacy claim was dismissed
because management had “passively” received Ehling’s Facebook posts
from one of Ehling’s Facebook friends. 44
And careless employees should not expect much privacy protection. For
example, Santiago Victor linked his personal Apple account to his
employer/Sunbelt-provided iPhone. 45 When Victor left Sunbelt he returned
the iPhone, and then linked the iPhone provided by his new employer with
his personal Apple account. 46 However, Victor did not “unlink” the Sunbeltprovided iPhone from his account; as a result, for several weeks, electronic
data and messages, including text messages, sent to Victor’s new employerprovided iPhone were also sent to his Sunbelt-provided iPhone. 47 The court
concluded:
Victor personally caused the transmission of his text messages to the
Sunbelt iPhone by syncing his new devices to his Apple account without
first unlinking his Sunbelt iPhone. As such, even if he subjectively
harbored an expectation of privacy in his text messages, such expectation
cannot be characterized as objectively reasonable, since it was Victor’s
under all circumstances[;]” “I cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using
as my North Star a case [Smith] that predates the rise of cell phones.”); Rebecca Lipman, Note, The Third
Party Exception: Reshaping an Imperfect Doctrine for the Digital Age, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471,
479–80 (2014) (noting that Miller and Smith took note to minimize the significance of the information
attained by law enforcement, in contrast to the extent to which non-content data can be analyzed today).
42. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 661–63 (D.N.J. 2013).
43. Id. at 663.
44. Id. at 674 (“The evidence does not show that Defendants [MONOC management] obtained
access to Plaintiff’s Facebook page by, say, logging into her account, logging into another employee’s
account, or asking another employee to log into Facebook. Instead, the evidence shows that Defendants
were the passive recipients of information that they did not seek out or ask for. Plaintiff voluntarily gave
information to her Facebook friend, and her Facebook friend voluntarily gave that information to
someone else. This may have been a violation of trust, but it was not a violation of privacy.” (citations
omitted)). Contrast with Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2008 WL 6085437 (D.N.J.
July 25, 2008) (allowing an invasion of privacy claim to go to the jury where one employee with access
to a limited-access MySpace group was allegedly coerced into providing managers access to the site;
though the jury ultimately denied the invasion of privacy claim, No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420
(D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009)).
45. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Victor, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
46. Id. at 1028–29.
47. Id.
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conduct that directly caused the transmission of his text messages to
Sunbelt in the first instance. 48

Chapter 7 of the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law 49 addresses
employee privacy and personal autonomy. As reported by the Restatement,
employees have a right not to be subjected to wrongful employer intrusions
upon their protected privacy interests. 50 Fundamentally, Chapter 7 applies
the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort developed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652B, to the employment relationship. 51 Chapter 7 attempts to strike
a balance between the employer’s responsibility for conduct within the
workplace and employees’ privacy rights. 52
With respect to monitoring electronic communications and data, section
7.03 reports that “[a]n employee has a protected privacy interest against
employer intrusion into physical and electronic locations, including
employer-provided locations, as to which the employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.” 53 The focus of section 7.03 is on the employee’s
interest in keeping his or her physical person, certain physical functions,
personal possessions, and activities in certain physical and electronic
locations private from employer intrusion. 54 The privacy interests in
locations reported in section 7.03(a)(2) include non-workplace physical or
electronic locations in which the employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, such as the employee’s home, property, and personal possessions. 55
The approach expressed by section 7.03 is that when it comes to
personal property or locations that the employee owns or has access to
outside of the workplace, employees will generally enjoy the same
expectations of privacy against employer intrusions as they do with respect
to other third-party intrusions. 56 Importantly, even though the employee
might not expect an employer to intrude into non-workplace locations, the
employee cannot expect a greater level of freedom from intrusion by the
employer than by the general public. 57 By the same token, the employer is
not privileged to intrude upon an employee’s privacy outside the workplace
48. Id. at 1035 (footnote omitted).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW ch. 7 (AM. LAW INST. 2014).
50. Id. § 7.01.
51. Id. § 7.01 cmt. b.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 7.03(a)(2) (emphasis added).
54. Id. § 7.03 cmt. a.
55. Id. § 7.03 cmt. d.
56. Id. § 7.03 cmt. g.
57. Id. Courts have generally found no invasion of privacy when employers have observed
employees in public places where the employees’ expectations of privacy are diminished. See, e.g., York
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780
So. 2d 685 (Ala. 2000).
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simply because the employer is otherwise pursuing a legitimate business
interest. 58
In congruence with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B, Chapter 7 of
the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law recognizes that, in order to be
actionable, an intrusion upon seclusion must be highly offensive to a
reasonable person under the circumstances. 59 In the employment context, the
Restatement reports that an intrusion is highly offensive if the nature,
manner, and scope of the intrusion are clearly unreasonable when judged
against the employer’s legitimate business interests or the public’s interests
in intruding. 60 Owing, then, to the “public” nature of the workplace, finding
an intrusion to be highly offensive creates a high bar for workplace privacy.
B. Federal Statutes that May Protect Employee Work-Related
Communications
Although, on their face, a variety of federal laws appear promising in
providing workplace privacy protections, in reality they provide very little
protection. And when they do provide protections, it is usually in very
constrained circumstances, such as when a worker’s private, third-party
online account is involved. The statutes do not provide any overarching
workplace privacy protection. 61 Federal labor law, on the other hand,
provides some of the strongest restrictions on employer monitoring, but, as
explained in this part, the foundation for those restrictions may be subject to
a changing composition of the National Labor Relations Board. And when it
comes to workers recording workplace conversations, labor law is in
complete opposition to common law. Finally, the one area providing
anything close to an overarching right of privacy in employee electronic
communications and data appears to come from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 cmt. g.; see, e.g., Burns v. Masterbrand
Cabinets, Inc., 874 N.E.2d 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (remanding intrusion claim for trial based on
surveillance of employee’s home for workers’ compensation case, including entry into the home on false
pretenses); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634 (Ark. 2002) (ruling that search of employee’s
home for stolen merchandise was intrusion); Ass’n Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454, 461 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001). But see Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
employee had no privacy right against employer, despite investigator posing as a process server in order
to gain entrance to and taking photographs inside of the employee’s home, because he had filed a workers’
compensation claim).
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06(a).
60. Id. § 7.06(b).
61. Cf. Richards, supra note 2, at 1942 (“[T]he general principle under which American law
operates is that surveillance is legal unless forbidden.”).

2018]

WORK-RELATED MONITORING

231

1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
By its name, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA) may appear to be an avenue of privacy protection for employee
electronic communications. Fundamentally, Title I of the ECPA 62 (also
commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act) prohibits the interception of any
“wire, oral, or electronic communication.” 63 And, “any person whose wire,
oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally
used in violation of [the ECPA]” may bring a civil action for relief. 64 But as
one court noted over one dozen years ago, “the ECPA was written prior to
the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the existing
statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication
like . . . secure website[s].” 65
Courts have recognized limited circumstances in which an employer
may violate the ECPA in accessing employee communications. For example,
in Brahmana v. Lembo, 66 the District Court for the Northern District of
California refused to dismiss an employee’s ECPA claim that his employer
had used key loggers to ascertain the password to his private email account
and access that account. 67 The fundamental requirement for an ECPA
violation is an intentional interception of electronic communications during
transmission from inception to end-point. 68 In addition, exceptions within
the Wiretap Act also render much of the Act inapplicable to ordinary uses of
computer and communications systems within the workplace. Service
providers are exempt from liability for intercepting, disclosing, or using
communications transmitted over the service in the ordinary course of

62. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. I, 100 Stat. 1848,
1848–59 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
64. Id. § 2520(a)–(b).
65. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
66. No. C-09-00106 RMW, 2009 WL 1424438 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2009).
67. Id. at *3.
68. See Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Victor, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Here, Victor
has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Sunbelt ‘intentionally intercepted’ any of his text
messages.”; supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text); Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 898 F.2d 401, 405
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that Congress specifically intended that “inadvertent interceptions are not crimes
under the [ECPA]”); Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. 11-101Erie, 2012 WL 12887775, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb.
17, 2012) (“[A] qualifying ‘intercept’ under the ECPA can only occur where a communication is accessed
at some point between the time the communication is sent and the time it is received by the destination
server, at which point it becomes a ‘stored communication’ within the meaning of the Stored
Communications Act.”); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
employer did not “intercept” employee’s email within the meaning of Title I of the ECPA because an
“intercept” can only occur contemporaneously with transmission and it did not access employee’s email
at the initial time of transmission).
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business. 69 The Wiretap Act also exempts from liability anyone who
intercepts a communication who is a party to the communication, or where
one of the parties has consented to interception. 70 As a result, employers who
own and provide their own email and communications systems are exempt
from Title I of the ECPA. 71 And employers who outsource their email and
communications systems to service providers can also rely on Title I
exceptions when they work with their service provider to intercept employee
communications. 72 One scholar has concluded the Wiretap Act is already
tilted toward employers’ interests; it provides no protection for employees
from several types of monitoring, including GPS and silent video; and
provides no baseline of privacy, such as prohibiting monitoring of
communications made between employees and family members in their
homes regardless of whether an employee consents. 73
Title II of the ECPA, the Stored Communications Act 74 (SCA), makes
it unlawful to access stored communications. The SCA was enacted to
address “the growing problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining
access to, and sometimes tampering with, electronic or wire communications
that are not intended to be available to the public.” 75 The SCA is violated
when a person “(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2)
intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby
obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system . . . .” 76 The
ECPA defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an

69. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
70. Id. § 2511(2)(d); see also Sporer v. UAL Corp., No. C 08-02835 JSW, 2009 WL 2761329, at
*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2009) (holding the employer’s monitoring of employees’ email messages did
not violate § 2511 because employees impliedly consented to monitoring by consenting to the employer’s
monitoring policy).
71. See Lisa Smith-Butler, Workplace Privacy: We’ll Be Watching You, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 53,
67 (2009).
72. See Leonard Court & Courtney Warmington, The Workplace Privacy Myth: Why Electronic
Monitoring Is Here to Stay, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 15, 28–30 (2004).
73. Levinson, supra note 6, at 475. Despite these shortcomings, Professor Levinson argues “the
ECPA can and should be interpreted to provide employees some significant level of protection for their
electronic communications.” See generally id.
74. Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711
(2012)).
75. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 35 (1986).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(1).
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electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication[.]” 77
This definition of electronic storage has caused some confusion with
respect to messages stored on a third-party web-based email system. It is
accepted that unread email messages can be considered temporarily stored
incidental to transmission. But are read messages being stored for backup
purposes? 78 The complexities, confusion, and conflicting opinions with
respect to applying the SCA to electronic communications are beyond the
scope of this article. Suffice it to say the “SCA is not a catch-all statute
designed to protect the privacy of stored Internet communications[.]” 79 At
least one court has held that employers are exempt from liability under the
SCA for accessing employee email messages stored on their computer
systems. 80 The District Court for the District of Maryland has ruled,
however, that an employer may be liable under the SCA for accessing a
former employee’s personal Gmail messages stored on Google’s servers that
were once stored on the former employee’s employer-provided cell phone. 81
2. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 82 (CFAA) provides civil and
criminal penalties for anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer
77. Id. § 2510(17).
78. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A remote computing
service might be the only place a user stores his messages; in that case, the messages are not stored for
backup purposes.”); United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009); see also Garcia
v. City of Laredo, Tex., 702 F.3d 788, 793 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding text messages and photos stored
on a cell phone are not in “electronic storage” as defined by the SCA). But see Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest.
Grp., No. 06-5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009) (refusing to overturn jury
verdict that defendant had violated SCA by coercing employee to provide password to restricted-access
web site); Borchers v. Franciscan Tertiary Province of the Sacred Heart, Inc., 962 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2011) (concluding the employer accessing multiple email messages on plaintiff’s AOL account, which
employee had temporarily accessed through employer’s computer system, could be actionable under the
SCA).
79. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214 (2004). See also generally Melissa Medina, Note, The
Stored Communications Act: An Old Statute for Modern Times, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 267 (2013) (critiquing
the SCA).
80. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 114–15 (3d Cir. 2003).
81. Levin v. ImpactOffice LLC, No. TDC-16-2790, 2017 WL 2937938, at * 5 (D. Md. July 10,
2017) (“Where [Plaintiff’s] assertions . . . suggest that [she] stored copies of the emails from her personal
Gmail account on her cell phone while also maintaining copies on Google’s servers, she has adequately
alleged that the emails were in ‘electronic storage’ because they were stored for backup purposes,
regardless of whether they were unopened. . . . [Plaintiff] will be required to prove that the allegedly
accessed emails were either unopened and in temporary storage under [18 U.S.C.] § 2510(17)(A) or were
stored for the purposes of backup protection under [18 U.S.C.] § 2510(17)(B).”).
82. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2012)).
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without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . .
information from any protected computer[.]” 83 The issue raised is whether
an employer who allegedly gains unauthorized access to employees’ email
messages may also be in violation of the CFAA. Theofel v. Farey-Jones 84
involved a commercial dispute between Farey-Jones and International
Capital Associates, Inc. (ICA) in which Farey-Jones issued an overly-broad
subpoena for ICA email messages stored with a third-party provider. 85
Theofel, an ICA employee whose email messages were read by Farey-Jones
pursuant to the subpoena, sued Farey-Jones for, inter alia, violation of the
CFAA. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
holding that the CFAA did not apply to unauthorized access of a third party’s
computer. 86 According to the Ninth Circuit, “Individuals other than the
computer’s owner may be proximately harmed by unauthorized access,
particularly if they have rights to data stored on it.” 87 Based on Theofel, an
employer that improperly accesses an employee’s private third-party webbased email system would also violate the CFAA 88 (provided the employee
could show that the value of the information obtained was at least $5,000). 89
3. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
Employers who fire or otherwise discipline employees based on workrelated electronic communications may run afoul of the National Labor
Relations Act 90 (NLRA). Section 7 of the NLRA expresses the right of
employees to “engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of . . . mutual
aid or protection.” 91 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7].” 92 While the NLRA does
not define “concerted activities,” it has been interpreted to arise whenever
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). A protected computer includes a computer “which is used in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.” Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
84. 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
85. Id. at 1071.
86. Id. at 1078.
87. Id.
88. But see Owen v. Cigna, 188 F. Supp. 3d 790, 793 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that former employer
did not violate CFAA when accessing former employee’s private email account using computer owned
by former employer; “Neither party has identified—and the Court has not found—any CFAA case
involving an employee’s claim that her former employer exceeded its authority to access its own
computer.”).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2012).
90. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–169 (2012)).
91. Id. § 7 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157).
92. Id. § 8(1) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)).
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employees collectively seek to improve their lot as employees. 93 For
example, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which enforces the
NLRA, has found that employees discussing on Facebook improper state tax
withholding by their employer were engaged in protected concerted activity,
precisely because the participants were seeking to initiate, induce, or prepare
for group action related to a workplace issue (the calculation of the
employees’ tax withholding). 94
As noted above, an employer’s policy can have a significant impact on
whether an employee may have an objective expectation of privacy in workrelated electronic communications. 95 Employers do not, however, have
unlimited freedom to restrict employees’ electronic communications through
their policies. Where a workplace rule is likely to have a chilling effect on
Section 7 rights, its maintenance may be considered an unfair labor practice,
even absent evidence of enforcement. 96 A rule that explicitly restricts
activities protected by Section 7 is unlawful. 97 Even if a rule does not
explicitly restrict activity protected by Section 7, it can still be unlawful if:
“(1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section
7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.” 98
Applying Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, the NLRB has deemed
many employer email and social media policies to be unlawful under the
NLRA. 99 For example, in Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille, the NLRB
93. See St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., 350 N.L.R.B. 203, 211 (2007), enforced, 519 F.3d
373 (7th Cir. 2008); see also NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962) (referring to workers
who had walked off the job because complaints of an unacceptably cold work shop had been ignored as
“workers [acting] together to better their working conditions”). Section 7 rights are available to all
employees, not just unionized workers; indeed, Section 7 rights are especially important for unorganized
employees for they have no representative to take their grievances to their employer. See id. at 14-15.
94. Three D, LLC d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille v. NLRB, 629 Fed. App’x 33, 35–36 (2d
Cir. 2015). Indeed, one employee was considered to have engaged in protected concerted activity by
merely “liking” part of the Facebook conversation. Id. at 37; see also Mexican Radio Corp., 02-CA168989, 2017 WL 1507464 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Apr. 26, 2017) (finding by Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) that employees engaged in protected concerted activities by positively responding via email,
as a group, to a former employee’s email complaints about restaurant’s treatment of employees). See
generally Christine Neylon O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law Protection for Concerted Communication on
Social Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29 (2011) (analyzing NLRB’s approach to protected concerted
activity through social media posts); Robert Sprague, Facebook Meets the NLRB: Employee Online
Communications and Unfair Labor Practices, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 957 (2012) (reviewing NLRB
considerations of employee conduct constituting protected concerted activity).
95. Supra note 33 and accompanying text and note 40.
96. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
97. Lutheran Heritage Vill.-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (2004).
98. Id. at 647.
99. See generally Christine Neylon O’Brien, The Top Ten NLRB Cases on Facebook Firings and
Employer Social Media Policies, 92 OR. L. REV. 337 (2014) (reviewing social media policies); Robert
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concluded that the employer’s social media policy that prohibited
“[inappropriate] discussions” could be interpreted by employees as
prohibiting discussions about the employees’ terms and conditions of
employment. 100 Recently, an NLRB ALJ concluded the following employer
policy was unlawful: “Any inappropriate or prohibited Internet, voice mail
or e-mail access or use may result in discipline up to and including
termination from employment.” 101 As the ALJ explained:
The rule prohibits “inappropriate or prohibited” use of the internet and
email, as well as transmitting information to anyone that is “defamatory”
and “otherwise offensive[”]. These terms are not defined by [the
employer], and the policy fails to provide any examples to clarify for
employees what is to be considered inappropriate, defamatory or
otherwise offensive. As such, employees would reasonably consider their
Section 7 protected activity to be prohibited acts. For example, employees
would reasonably fear that criticizing their employer to a third party or to
one another would lead to discipline as the criticism may be viewed by the
employer as inappropriate, defamatory or offensive. 102

In Purple Communications, Inc., 103 the NLRB ruled that an employer’s
policy prohibiting personal use of the employer’s email system violated
employees’ Section 7 rights: “employees who have rightful access to their
employer’s email system in the course of their work have a right to use the
email system to engage in Section 7-protected communications on
nonworking time.” 104 The NLRB expressly pointed out, however, that “an
employer [is not] ordinarily prevented from notifying its employees . . . that
it monitors (or reserves the right to monitor) computer and email use for
legitimate management reasons and that employees may have no expectation
of privacy in their use of the employer’s email system.” 105
Sprague & Abigail E. Fournier, Online Social Media and the End of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine,
52 WASHBURN L.J. 557, 563–69 (2013) (reviewing NLRB opinions and decisions regarding lawfulness
of employee social media policies).
100. 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31, 2014 WL 4182705, at *8–9 (Aug. 22, 2014), enforced sub nom. Three
D, LLC d/b/a Triple Play Sports Bar and Grille v. NLRB, 629 Fed. App’x 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2015).
101. Thrifty Dollar Auto. Grp., 27-CA-173054, slip op. at 6 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Jan. 27, 2017),
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d458234634f [https://perma.cc/Z86E-79B2].
102. Id. at 7.
103. 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 2014 WL 6989135 (Dec. 11, 2014), adopted by 365 N.L.R.B. No. 50,
2017 WL 1132013 (Mar. 24, 2017).
104. 2014 WL 6989135, at *14.
105. Id. at *15. However, “[a]n employer that changes its monitoring practices in response to union
or other protected, concerted activity, however, will violate the Act.” Id. at *15 n.75. But see Quicken
Loans, Inc., 07-CA-145794, slip op. at 29 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Apr. 7, 2016),
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4582085e90
[https://perma.cc/CT5U-YTMY]
(declining to extend Purple Communications’ rationale to company policy prohibiting employees from
downloading non-business related information or participating in web-based surveys without
authorization; “I do not read Purple Communications to grant unrestricted right to download materials
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4. Turning the Tables—Employees Monitoring Employers
It is becoming more and more common for employees, often using their
smartphones, to record workplace conversations and incidents. 106 Twelve
states have statutes that prohibit recording communications without the
consent of all parties to the conversation. 107 Most of the statutes emulate Title
I of the ECPA, 108 prohibiting the interception or attempt to intercept any
wire, oral or electronic communication (without the consent of all parties to
the conversation). But some of the statutes have their own nuances. For
example, California’s statute applies only to confidential communications,
but defines confidential communications as “any communication carried on
in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the
communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto.” 109 This
definition excludes, however, “a communication made in . . . any . . .
circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably

from the internet onto the Employer’s email system. . . [or] a presumptive right to freely download
materials from the internet onto the employer’s server.”).
106. See, e.g., James R. Beyer, Employers: Assume Your Employees Are Taping You . . . There’s An
App for That!, SEYFARTH SHAW: WORKPLACE WHISTLEBLOWER (June 11, 2013),
http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/WorkplaceWhistleblowerBeyer061113.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8KU-VUT5] (noting lawyers representing employees say more than fifty percent of
their clients bring in digital evidence, saying they are more surprised when someone comes into their
office without digital evidence); L.M. Sixel, One-Third of Workers with Beefs Tape Their Bosses, HOUS.
CHRON. (Feb. 3, 2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/business/sixel/article/One-third-of-workerswith-beefs-tape-their-bosses-1684505.php [https://perma.cc/G872-XML8] (reporting Houston EEOC
office estimates that one-third of employees who visit it to file discrimination complaints bring secretly
made recordings of sensitive conversations with their bosses or with human resources); see also Gabriel
Sherman, The Revenge of Roger’s Angels: How Fox News Women Took Down the Most Powerful, and
(Sept.
2,
2016,
7:30
AM),
Predatory,
Man
in
Media,
N.Y.
MAG.
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/09/how-fox-news-women-took-down-roger-ailes.html
[https://perma.cc/WG9Y-DNT9] (reporting that Gretchen Carlson secretly recorded conversations with
Fox News then-Chairman and CEO Roger Ailes to bolster her sexual harassment lawsuit against him).
107. California (CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (2017)), Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d
(1990)), Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2402 (2014), Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (2015),
Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2016)), Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402
(2015)), Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99 (1998)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8213 (2007)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2017)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT.
§ 165.540 (2016)), Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(4) (2016)), Washington (WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.73.030 (1986)). Nevada’s statute could be construed to prohibit one person from recording a
conversation involving multiple parties unless one of those parties consented. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.650 (1989) (prohibiting a person from intruding “upon the privacy of other persons by
surreptitiously listening to, monitoring or recording, or attempting to listen to, monitor or record, by
means of any mechanical, electronic or other listening device, any private conversation engaged in by the
other persons . . . unless authorized to do so by one of the persons engaging in the conversation”); see
Laws on Recording Conversations in All 50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C.,
https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/LAWS-ON-RECORDINGCONVERSATIONS-CHART.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9X3-5CBJ] (last updated Mar. 10, 2017).
108. See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text.
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(c).
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expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.” 110
Connecticut’s statute only applies to “oral private telephonic
communication.” 111 Illinois’s statute applies to using an eavesdropping
device in a surreptitious manner. 112 Massachusetts defines “interception” to
mean “to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid another to secretly hear or
secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication through the
use of any intercepting device by any person other than a person given prior
authority by all parties to such communication[.]” 113 And that portion of
Montana’s statute that prohibits using electronic communications “to terrify,
intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend . . . [by using] obscene, lewd,
or profane language, suggest[ing] a lewd or lascivious act, or threaten[ing]
to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of the person” 114
has been held unconstitutionally overbroad. 115
Texas does not have a statute banning secret recordings. The Dallas
County Community College District does, however, have a policy
prohibiting employees from making secret recordings, the violation of which
could lead to termination. 116 Not only is there no known common law right
for employees to secretly record conversations with their supervisors,117
“numerous courts have upheld the termination of employees for making or
attempting to make secret recordings in violation of a company policy.” 118
As discussed above, company policies may run afoul of the NLRA if
they are deemed to chill or potentially chill employees’ exercise of their

110. Id.
111. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-570d(a).
112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2(a)(1). The Illinois Supreme Court ruled the original version of
the statute, that did not specify surreptitious eavesdropping, deemed “all conversations to be private and,
thus, not subject to recording absent consent, even if the participants have no expectation of privacy.”
People v. Melongo, 6 N.E.3d 120, 126–27 (Ill. 2014); see Michael J. Gibson, Comment, Just Because It’s
Legal Doesn’t Mean You Can Do It: The Legality of Employee Eavesdropping and Illinois Workplace
Recording Policies, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 913 (2015) (addressing workplace recording policies in light of
the statute’s amendment).
113. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (1998).
114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213(1)(a) (2007).
115. State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 769 (Mont. 2013).
116. Mohamad v. Dallas Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 3:10-CV-1189-L-BF, 2012 WL 4512488, at
*7–8 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2012).
117. Id. at *9.
118. Id. (citing numerous cases in support); see also Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724
(7th Cir. 2008) (holding evidence supported employer’s legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff—she
had secretly tape-recorded a conversation with employer’s representatives—rather than Title VII
retaliation); McBeth v. Shearer’s Foods, Inc., No. 1:12CV00086, 2014 WL 4385764, at *8 (W.D. Va.
Sept. 4, 2014) (granting employer’s motion for summary judgment in discrimination claim where
employee was fired for secretly making recording at work in violation of company policy).
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Section 7 rights. 119 In a series of decisions, the NLRB has severely curtailed
the right of employers to ban workplace recordings. 120 For the most part,
these decisions rest upon application of Lutheran Heritage VillageLivonia. 121 In Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, the NLRB concluded that two
employer rules—“Camera phones may not be used to take photos on
property without permission from a Director or above” and “Cameras, any
type of audio visual recording equipment and/or recording devices may not
be used unless specifically authorized for business purposes (e.g. events)”—
were unlawfully overbroad. 122 The Board stated, “Employee photographing
and videotaping is protected by Section 7 when employees are acting in
concert for their mutual aid and protection and no overriding employer
interest is present.” 123 In addition, neither of these prohibitions was tied to
any particularized employer interest, such as the privacy of its patrons. 124
Whole Foods Market banned any recordings without prior approval,
with the purpose of eliminating “a chilling effect on the expression of views
that may exist when one person is concerned that his or her conversation with

119. See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text; see also Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 363
N.L.R.B. No. 87, 2015 WL 9460031, at *4 n.11 (Dec. 24, 2015), enforced sub nom. Whole Foods Mkt.
Grp., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 16-0002-ag, 16-0346, 2017 WL 2374843 (2d Cir. June 1, 2017) (“Where
reasonable employees are uncertain as to whether a rule restricts activity protected under the Act, that
rule can have a chilling effect on employees’ willingness to engage in protected activity. Employees, who
are dependent on the employer for their livelihood, would reasonably take a cautious approach and refrain
from engaging in Sec. 7 activity for fear of running afoul of a rule whose coverage is unclear.”).
120. See Stephens Media, LLC, d/b/a Hawaii Tribune-Herald v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 1241, 1257 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (upholding Board ruling that employee was entitled to reinstatement because he was engaged
in protected concerted activity, despite having secretly tape-recorded conversations at work); T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 171, 2016 WL 1743244 (Apr. 29, 2016) (Board concluding employer’s
overly-broad rule restricting employees from using cameras and audio and recording devices in the
workplace could reasonably be read by employees to prohibit recording that would be protected by
Section 7); Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 9460031 (Board concluding that rules prohibiting the
recording of conversations, phone calls, images, or company meetings with a camera or recording device
without prior approval by management would reasonably be construed by employees to prohibit Section
7 activity); Caesars Entm’t d/b/a Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 2015 WL
5113232 (Aug. 27, 2015) (Board concluding that rule banning use of cameras, camera phones,
audiovisual, and other recording equipment unlawfully overbroad); Opryland Hotel, 323 N.L.R.B. 723
(1997) (Board ruling that in the absence of a rule, prohibition, or practice against employees using or
possessing tape recorders at work, such possession or use does not constitute misconduct that would
defeat reinstatement); AT&T Mobility, LLC, 05-CA-178637, 2017 WL 1488998 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges Apr. 25, 2017) (finding by ALJ that company’s no-recording policy was illegal, following TMobile USA, Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., and Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, despite company’s concerns
for customer privacy).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98.
122. 2015 WL 5113232, at *4.
123. Id. (“Such protected conduct may include, for example, employees recording images of
employee picketing, documenting unsafe workplace equipment or hazardous working conditions,
documenting and publicizing discussions about terms and conditions of employment, or documenting
inconsistent application of employer rules.” (footnote omitted)).
124. Id.
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another is being secretly recorded.” 125 The Board concluded this ban
“unqualifiedly prohibit[s] all workplace recording” and it does not
“differentiate between recordings protected by Section 7 and those that are
unprotected.” 126 In T-Mobile USA, Inc., the employer maintained the
following policy:
To prevent harassment, maintain individual privacy, encourage open
communication, and protect confidential information employees are
prohibited from recording people or confidential information using
cameras, camera phones/devices, or recording devices (audio or video) in
the workplace. Apart from customer calls that are recorded for quality
purposes, employees may not tape or otherwise make sound recordings of
work-related or workplace discussions. 127

As with Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., the Board concluded TMobile’s “rule [did] not differentiate between recordings that are protected
by Section 7 and those that are not, and[, additionally, included] in its
prohibition recordings made during nonwork time and in nonwork areas.” 128
T-Mobile argued its recording restriction was “justified by its general
interest in maintaining employee privacy, protecting confidential
information, and promoting open communication.” 129 The Board rejected TMobile’s “proffered rationales” because they “cannot justify the rule’s broad
restriction that employees would reasonably read as prohibiting activity
protected by Section 7.” 130
The NLRB has found a workplace recording prohibition lawful. In
Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc., 131 the hospital had promulgated a rule
prohibiting “[t]he use of cameras for recording images of patients and/or
hospital equipment, property, or facilities . . . .” 132 Here, the Board did not
consider the prohibition unlawfully overbroad because the “privacy interests
of hospital patients are weighty, and [the hospital] has a significant interest
in preventing the wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health
information, including by unauthorized photography.” 133
125. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 9460031, at *1.
126. Id. at *4 (“That the rule contains language setting forth an intention to promote open
communication and dialogue does not cure the rule of its overbreadth.”).
127. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 171, 2016 WL 1743244, at *4 (Apr. 29, 2016).
128. Id. at *5.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 357 N.L.R.B. 659 (2011), enforced in relevant part, 715 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
132. Id. at 662.
133. Id. at 663 (“Employees would reasonably interpret [the hospital’s] rule as a legitimate means
of protecting the privacy of patients and their hospital surroundings, not as a prohibition of protected
activity.”).
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Board Member—now Chairman—Philip Miscimarra dissented in
Whole Foods Market Group, Inc. with respect to the majority-Board’s
application of Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia. Chairman Miscimarra
took issue with the majority’s conclusion that “employees would reasonably
read the rules as prohibiting recording activity that would be protected by
Section 7.” 134 Noting that the rules themselves state that their purpose is to
“encourage open communication, free exchange of ideas, spontaneous and
honest dialogue and an atmosphere of trust” and “to eliminate a chilling
effect on the expression of views . . . especially when sensitive or
confidential matters are being discussed[,]” 135 he believes “[t]he rules are no
less solicitous of open, free, spontaneous and honest conversations about
union representation or group action for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection than of other subjects of conversation.” 136 Chairman Miscimarra
has expressed his displeasure in other cases with the way in which the Board
has applied Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia. He has stated, for example,
that he believes the time has come to abandon the analysis. 137 He believes
the Board must, instead:
[E]valuate at least two things: (i) the potential adverse impact of the rule
on NLRA-protected activity, and (ii) the legitimate justifications an
employer may have for maintaining the rule. The Board must engage in a
meaningful balancing of these competing interests, and a facially neutral
rule should be declared unlawful only if the justifications are outweighed
by the adverse impact on Section 7 activity. 138

As noted above, Philip Miscimarra is now Chairman of the NLRB. In
addition, two open Board positions have been filled by the Trump
administration and confirmed by the current Senate. If the two new Board
members share Chairman Miscimarra’s concerns with the manner in which
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia has been applied, we may see a
fundamental shift in determinations of whether employer policies—norecording as well as social media in general—are unlawfully overbroad. 139

134. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 2015 WL 9460031, at *4 (Dec. 24, 2015),
enforced sub nom. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc. v. NLRB, Nos. 16-0002-ag, 16-0346, 2017 WL 2374843
(2d Cir. June 1, 2017).
135. Id. at *6 (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting).
136. Id. (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting) (“I believe it strains credulity to find that an employee
could reasonably interpret the no-recording rules to prohibit Section 7 activity.”).
137. William Beaumont Hosp., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 2016 WL 1461576, at *8 (Apr. 13, 2016)
(Miscimarra, Member, dissenting).
138. Id. (Miscimarra, Member, dissenting) (emphasis in original).
139. At publication, the NLRB revised its analysis of the Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia
standard to reflect Chairman Miscimarra’s earlier dissents, as reflected William Beaumont Hospital (see
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5. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In a few cases, federal magistrates have protected employee privacy by
rejecting what they considered to be overly broad discovery requests. In
Bakhit v. Safety Marking, Inc., 140 the plaintiff sought access to text messages
of his former fellow employees in his racial discrimination lawsuit against
his former employer. 141 Noting that the right to information through
discovery “is counterbalanced by a responding party’s confidentiality or
privacy interests[,]” 142 the magistrate was concerned with the implication of
the individual defendants’ privacy interests in the data stored on their cell
phones. 143 In Crabtree v. Angie’s List, Inc., 144 the plaintiffs finalized sales
with service providers for advertising on the Angie’s List website and spent
a significant portion of their workday using their personal computers and cell
phones. 145 When the plaintiffs initiated a Fair Labor Standards Act lawsuit
against Angie’s List claiming unpaid overtime compensation, the defendant
sought to obtain GPS and location services data from the plaintiffs’ personal
cell phones to “construct a detailed and accurate timeline of when Plaintiffs
were or were not working.” 146 The magistrate denied the request because it
would reveal “all GPS/location data for 24-hours a day for a one year period
from a personal device that would be tracking Plaintiffs’ movements well
outside of their working time.” 147
C. State Statutes that May Protect Employee Work-Related
Communications
As noted above, twelve states outlaw surreptitious—i.e., without the
consent of all parties—recording of conversations. 148 These twelve states 149
appear to support the position reported in the Restatement (Third) of
supra text accompanying note 138). See Boeing Co., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 154, 2017 WL 6403495 (Dec. 14,
2017).
140. No. 3:13CV1049 (JCH), 2014 WL 2916490 (D. Conn. June 26, 2014).
141. Id. at *1–2.
142. Id. at *2 (quoting Genworth Fin. Wealth Mgmt., Inc. v. McMullan, 267 F.R.D. 443, 446 (D.
Conn. 2010)).
143. Id. at *3 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)). But see Freres v. Xyngular Corp.,
No. 2:13–cv–400–DAK–PMW, 2014 WL 1320273 (D. Utah Mar. 31, 2014) (permitting discovery of
information stored on plaintiff’s cell phone).
144. No. 1:16-cv-00877-SEB-MJD, 2017 WL 413242 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2017).
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *2. See generally Agnieszka A. McPeak, Social Media, Smartphones, and Proportional
Privacy in Civil Discovery, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 235 (2015) (analyzing privacy protection with respect to
discovery requests).
148. See supra notes 107–115 and accompanying text.
149. Along with Nevada as well. See supra note 107.
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Employment Law: “Eavesdropping via wiretapping has been conspicuously
singled out on several occasions as precisely the kind of conduct that gives
rise to an intrusion-on-seclusion claim.” 150
In addition, two states, Connecticut 151 and Delaware, 152 require
employers to provide notice to employees of electronic monitoring.
However, Connecticut’s statute does not appear to provide much relief for
employees who believe they have been monitored without notice, as the
Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled the statute does not provide a private
right of action to aggrieved employees. 153
Twenty-five states have enacted what may generally be referred to as
social media privacy statutes. 154 Fundamentally, these statutes prohibit
employers (and prospective employers) from requiring or requesting
employees and job applicants 155 to disclose their usernames and passwords
to personal online accounts, often including personal email accounts. Many
of the statutes also prohibit employers from requesting employees and
applicants to access their accounts in the presence of the employer, 156 and

150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06 cmt. g (AM. LAW. INST. 2014) (citing
Narducci v. Vill. of Bellwood, 444 F. Supp. 2d 924, 938 (N.D. Ill. 2006)). For additional cases involving
employers surreptitiously recording employee conversations, see Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d
1063 (Cal. 2009) (holding employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their office protecting
against the employer’s installation of a secret video camera, but remanded to jury question of whether
intrusion was highly offensive); and Dorris v. Absher, 179 F.3d 420, 423–25 (6th Cir. 1999). But see
Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 651 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding “[t]he use of hidden
cameras in an open office setting does not automatically transform a non-private area into a private one”);
Nelson v. Salem State Coll., 845 N.E.2d 338 (Mass. 2006) (holding no expectation of privacy in office
to which other employees had a key).
151. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d (West 1998).
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (West 2002).
153. Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, 985 A.2d 328, 335 (Conn. 2010).
154. Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (West 2014); California: CAL. LAB. CODE § 980
(Deering 2014); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-127 (2014); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-40x (West 2016); Delaware: 19 DEL. CODE ANN. § 709A (West 2015); Illinois: 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 55/10 (2014); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:1951–1955 (2014); Maine: ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 616–619 (2015); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2014);
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.272–278 (2014); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-307 (West
2015); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-3501–3511 (West 2016); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 613.135 (West 2014); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. § 275:74 (2014); New Jersey: N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34:6B-5–10 (West 2014); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (West 2014); Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 173.2, 173.3 (West 2014); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330 (2013);
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-56-1 – -6 (West 2014); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 501-1001–1004 (West 2015); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101–201 (West 2014); Virginia: VA. CODE
ANN. § 40.1-28.7:5 (West 2015); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.44.200, 205 (2014); West
Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5H-1 (West 2016); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55 (West
2014).
155. New Mexico’s statute applies only to job applicants. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34(A).
156. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b)(2).
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some prohibit employers from requiring employees to add them to the list of
contacts associated with the employees’ accounts. 157
Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 7.04 reflects the privacy
concerns at the core of these state social media privacy statutes:
(a) An employee has a protected privacy interest in information relating
to the employee that is of a personal nature and that the employee has
made reasonable efforts to keep private.
(b) An employer intrudes upon this protected privacy interest by
requiring that the employee provide information described in subsection
(a) or by obtaining the information through deceit. 158
As this brief review of state statutes reveals, outside of employers
surreptitiously recording their employees’ conversations, these statutes
provide little meaningful workplace privacy protections. While the social
media privacy statutes appear the strongest, in reality the situation they
address has occurred rarely, and usually in relation to sensitive employment
positions, such as teachers, sheriff’s deputies, and corrections officials. 159
III. SMARTPHONES AND FITBITS
As the opening quote in this article from Riley v. California 160 implies,
courts are beginning to realize the capacity of devices such as smartphones
to store tremendous amounts of personal data. Those data can now include a
person’s locations twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. In addition,
wearable devices, such as the Fitbit, can track personal health information
including continuous heart rate, steps taken, stairs climbed, active minutes,
amount of sleep, and even GPS location. 161 What remains unanswered is
what privacy rights workers have when employers require or encourage the
use of these applications and devices, which can easily track movements and
activities during non-work time.

157. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-127(2)(a). For further analysis of these statutes, see Jordan
M. Blanke, The Legislative Response to Employers’ Requests for Password Disclosure, 14 J. HIGH TECH.
L. 42 (2014); Susan Park, Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed Act That Balances Legitimate
Employer Rights and Employee Privacy, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 779 (2014); and Robert Sprague, No Surfing
Allowed: A Review & Analysis of Legislation Prohibiting Employers from Demanding Access to
Employees’ & Job Applicants’ Social Media Accounts, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 481 (2014).
158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.04(a) & (b) (AM. LAW INST. 2014); see also
id. § 7.04 cmt. d.
159. See, e.g., Park, supra note 157, at 779–80; Sprague, supra note 157, at 142.
160. Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
161. Brown, supra note 8, at 7–8.
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A. GPS Tracking with Smartphones
As Arias v. Intermex Wire Transfer demonstrates, employers may be
inclined to track employees’ locations using the GPS feature in their
smartphones. 162 Because the case settled, we have no way of knowing the
strength of Arias’s invasion of privacy claim. Courts generally find no
privacy violation when the tracking device is installed on a company-owned
vehicle. 163 At least eleven states outlaw private citizens from installing or
using tracking devices, 164 though they regularly do not apply when the owner
or lessor of the vehicle consents to the placement of the tracking device. As
such, they provide no protection for private-sector employees when they are
driving a company car. For example, California broadly prohibits the use of
an “electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a
person.” 165 However, the California statute does not apply “when the
registered owner, lessor, or lessee of a vehicle has consented to the use of the
electronic tracking device with respect to that vehicle.” 166 Similarly,
Tennessee’s statute, like most of the other state statutes, prohibits the
installation of an electronic tracking device on or in a motor vehicle without
the consent of all the owners or lessees of the vehicle. 167 Texas makes it a
Class A misdemeanor to “knowingly install[] an electronic or mechanical
tracking device on a motor vehicle owned or leased by another person,” 168
but provides an affirmative defense if the accused “obtained the effective
162. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. See generally Haggins v. Verizon New England,
Inc., 648 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming Labor Management Relations Act preempted state-law
privacy claims where collective bargaining agreement required union employees to carry company-issued
cell phones containing GPS capabilities while on the job).
163. See, e.g., Elgin v. St. Louis Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 4:05CV970-DJS, 2005 WL 3050633,
at *3–4 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2005) (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 281 (1983)) (holding use of
a tracking device on defendant’s company car, even though it was assigned to plaintiff, does not constitute
a substantial intrusion upon plaintiff’s seclusion, as it revealed no more than highly public information as
to the van’s location; holding further that especially because the van was the property of defendant,
defendant’s use of the tracking device on its own vehicle does not rise to the level of being highly
offensive to a reasonable person); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1977)).
164. California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (1998); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(8)
(West 2014); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 934.425 (2015); Illinois: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-2.5 (2014);
Louisiana: LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:323 (2015); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539l (West 2010);
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-196.3 (West 2015); Rhode Island: 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-69-1 (West 2016); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-606 (2016); Texas: TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 16.06 (West 2009); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-60.5 (West 2013).
165. CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7(a). The statute defines an “electronic tracking device” as “any
device attached to a vehicle or other movable thing that reveals its location or movement by the
transmission of electronic signals.” Id. § 637.7(d).
166. Id. § 637.7(b).
167. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-606(a)(1)(B).
168. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.06(b).
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consent of the owner or lessee of the motor vehicle before the electronic or
mechanical tracking device was installed.” 169 While Illinois’s statute also
prohibits the use of an “electronic tracking device to determine the location
or movement of a person[,]” 170 it does not apply if the tracking device is used
by a business for the purpose of tracking vehicles driven by employees of
that business. 171
Note that, with the exception of Florida, the state statutes refer to
installing or attaching physical devices to vehicles, so they may not be
applicable to smartphone tracking applications (such as the type involved in
Arias). Florida is the only state that expressly mentions tracking
applications. 172 “Tracking application” is defined as “any software program
whose primary purpose is to track or identify the location or movement of
an individual.” 173 However, Florida’s statute does not apply to a “person
acting in good faith on behalf of a business entity for a legitimate business
purpose.” 174 It is uncertain which statute, if applicable, would have assisted
more, Arias or Intermex Wire Transfer.
As noted earlier, courts have generally found no invasion of privacy
when employers have observed employees in public places where the
employees’ expectations of privacy are diminished. 175 The same concept
applies to GPS tracking—individuals driving cars are out in public, generally
observable. 176
Public-sector employees’ privacy may, however, be afforded greater
protection. Under evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts are
beginning to acknowledge that prolonged GPS tracking can reveal a detailed,
intimate portrait of an individual’s actions, and that this prolonged tracking
169. Id. § 16.06(d)(1).
170. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-2.5(b) (2014).
171. Id. § 21-2.5(c)(3).
172. FLA. STAT. § 934.425(2) (2016).
173. Id. § 934.425(1)(b).
174. Id. § 934.425(4)(d).
175. See supra note 57.
176. See, e.g., Troeckler v. Zeiser, No. 14-cv-40-SMY-PMF, 2015 WL 1042187, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 5, 2015) (holding plaintiffs failed to plead that the placement of a GPS led to the disclosure of private
facts; specifically, that plaintiffs failed to plead that the GPS conveyed information that the vehicle was
driven into a private secluded location in which plaintiffs would have a reasonable expectation of privacy;
in other words, plaintiffs failed to plead how a passerby on the street or an individual in another vehicle
could not capture the same information that the tracking device captured and thus failed to plead the
disclosure of a private fact) (applying Illinois common law to facts related to interfamily dispute);
Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc., 21 A.3d 650, 654–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(finding no invasion of privacy from private investigator tracking vehicle movement with GPS for forty
days because the device never captured the movement of plaintiff into a secluded location that was not in
public view); HSG, LLC v. Edge-Works Mfg. Co., No. 15 CVS 309, 2015 WL 5824453 (N.C. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 5, 2015).
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can defeat an “expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as
reasonable.” 177 This approach has been applied to public-sector
employees. 178 As reported by the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law,
“the reasonable expectations of privacy of citizens and residents against
intrusion by government law-enforcement agents are likely to be
significantly different from the privacy expectations of employees against
employer intrusion.” 179
B. Employee Monitoring Through Wellness Programs
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 180 provides a
mechanism for employers, through their health insurance plans, to offer their
employees programs of health promotion or disease prevention—otherwise
known as wellness programs. 181 According to a 2016 Kaiser Family
Foundation employer health benefits survey, eighty-three percent of
surveyed large firms (200 or more employees) and forty-six percent of small
firms offer some sort of wellness program, while sixteen percent of large
firms and three percent of small firms collect health information from
employees through wearable devices such as a Fitbit or Apple Watch. 182 In
particular, employees may be rewarded for participating in a wellness
program by receiving up to thirty percent of the cost of coverage under the
employer’s health plan. 183 Forty-two percent of large firms with a wellness
program offer employees a financial incentive to participate in or complete

177. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
178. See Cunningham v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 997 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 2013) (holding
government agency placing GPS on personal vehicle of employee (without warrant) constituted an
unreasonable search because it was excessively intrusive, as the GPS device tracked appellant on
evenings, on weekends, and on vacation).
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2014).
180. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and
42 U.S.C.); also known as the Affordable Care Act and ACA; colloquially known as Obamacare.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2012). See generally Kristin Madison et al., Smoking, Obesity, Health
Insurance, and Health Incentives in the Affordable Care Act, 310 JAMA 143 (2013) (reviewing the
ACA’s health incentive initiatives). While the 115th Congress has attempted to repeal and replace the
Affordable Care Act, to date its revisions have not addressed wellness programs.
182. 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey, Summary of Findings, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Sept.
14, 2016), http://kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2016-summary-of-findings/ [https://perma.cc/9BQTAQUZ]; see also Elizabeth A. Brown, Workplace Wellness: Social Injustice, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 191, 196–205 (2017) (examining the growth of workplace wellness programs, the incentives
offered, and elements of various programs).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A).
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the program; 184 employees, on average, could potentially save between
approximately $1,900 to $5,400 per year. 185
While the Americans with Disabilities Act 186 (ADA) limits medical
examinations and disability-related inquiries, it also provides safe harbor
exceptions from its restrictions on medical testing for employer-mandated,
as well as voluntary, medical examinations tied to employers’ insurance 187
and wellness plans, 188 respectively. On May 17, 2016, the EEOC issued a
final rule with respect to the interplay between the ADA and wellness
programs. 189 Its amended regulation sets the criteria under which medical

184. 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey, Summary of Findings, supra note 182 (not reporting
number of small firms offering incentives).
185. Id. (reporting average annual costs for all types of single health plans at $6,435 and average
annual costs for all types of family health plans at $18,142).
186. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12203
(2012)).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2) provides a safe harbor exception for medical examinations that are tied
to employers’ insurance plans. See EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2015)
(holding ADA § 12201(c)(2) safe harbor provision extends to wellness programs that are part of an
insurance benefit plan):
The wellness program requirement was clearly intended to assist defendant with underwriting,
classifying or administering risks associated with the insurance plan. The undisputed evidence
establishes that defendant’s consultants used the data gathered through the wellness program to
classify plan participants’ health risks and calculate defendant’s projected insurance costs for
the benefit year. They then provided recommendations regarding what defendant should charge
the plan participants for maintenance medications and preventive care. They also made
recommendations regarding plan premiums, which included a recommendation that defendant
charge cigarette smokers higher premiums.
Id. at 856.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Flambeau, 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2017), but declined to
rule on the merits of the case due to mootness. See also Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D.
Fla. 2011), aff’d, 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding employer did not violate ADA by requiring
employees to undergo medical examinations and making medical inquiries of employees as part of
wellness program that was term of employer’s group health plan designed to develop and administer
current and future benefits plans using accepted principles of risk assessment). But see EEOC v. Orion
Energy Systems, Inc., No. 14–CV–1019, 2016 WL 5107019 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 19, 2016) (concluding
employer’s wellness program was not used to underwrite, classify, or administer risk, and therefore not
subject to the safe harbor exemption). The EEOC disagrees with the decisions in Flambeau and Seff,
believing they “have applied the safe harbor provision far more expansively to support employers’
imposition of penalties on employees who do not answer disability-related questions or undergo medical
examinations in connection with wellness programs[.]” Regulations Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,125, 31,131 (May 17, 2016) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2017)).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) provides an exception for medical examinations that are part of
“employee health programs” regardless of whether the employer sponsors any sort of employee benefit
plan at all. See Flambeau, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 854. “A covered entity may conduct voluntary medical
examinations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee health program
available to employees at that work site. A covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an
employee to perform job-related functions.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
189. Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,125; see also EEOC’s
Final Rule on Employer Wellness Programs and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/qanda-ada-wellness-final-rule.cfm
[https://perma.cc/H4K6XNSW] (last visited May 15, 2017) (providing overview of new rules).
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examinations are permitted. 190 In particular, the program must be
voluntary—it cannot deny coverage or benefits for non-participation, nor can
there be any retaliation for non-participation. 191 And providing an incentive
of up to thirty percent of health coverage cost will not render a program
involuntary. 192
Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 193 (GINA)
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees based on genetic
information, 194 and prohibits employers, with certain exceptions, from
acquiring genetic information about an employee. 195 Under the Affordable
Care Act, “[a] group health plan, and a health insurance issuer offering health
insurance coverage in connection with a group health plan, shall not request
or require an individual or a family member of such individual to undergo a
genetic test.” 196 However, under a voluntary wellness program, an employer
may provide a limited incentive 197 for an employee’s spouse to provide
information about the spouse’s current or past health status. 198 Finally,
legislation introduced in the House of Representatives, the Preserving

190. Regulations Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,139 (codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14).
191. See id. (codified at § 1630.12).
192. See id. at 31,140 (codified at § 1630.14(d)(3)). The EEOC calculates the thirty percent incentive
as thirty percent of self-only coverage, including both the employee’s and employer’s contribution. Id.
(codified at § 1630.14(d)(3)(i)). The incentive applies to an employee’s participation in a “healthcontingent” wellness program, which focuses “on an insured individual’s satisfaction of a particular
health-related factor.” AARP v. EEOC, No. 16-2113 (JDB), 2017 WL 3614430, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 22,
2017) (citing Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg.
33, 157, 33,180 (June 3, 2013) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54 (2017)). There are no incentive caps on
“participatory” wellness programs—i.e., “programs that do not condition receipt of the incentive on
satisfaction of a health factor.” Id. (citing Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group
Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33,167).
193. Pub. L. No. 110-223, tit. II, 122 Stat. 881, 905 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff11 (2012)).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a).
195. Id. § 2000ff-1(b).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(c)(1) (2012).
197. Essentially, thirty percent of self-only coverage, including both the employee’s and employer’s
contribution. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,143 (May 17, 2016) (codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iii)(A)).
198. Id. (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)); see also EEOC’s Final Rule on Employer Wellness
Programs
and
the
Genetic
Information
Nondiscrimination
Act,
EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/qanda-gina-wellness-final-rule.cfm
[https://perma.cc/D4KLY3JQ] (last visited May 15, 2017). While the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. I, § 702, 110 Stat. 1936, 1945 (1996) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 1182 (2015)), prohibits group health insurance plans from excluding employees based on, inter
alia, health status, medical history, genetic information, and disability (29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)), it does
allow group health plans to offer premium discounts or rebates for participation in wellness programs (id.
§ 1182(b)(2)(B)). The IRS has similar prohibitions and wellness program exceptions at 26 U.S.C. § 9802
(2012).
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Employee Wellness Programs Act, 199 allows collection of genetic
information of family members as part of a wellness program. 200
On a practical basis, just how voluntary are wellness programs when
individual employees may save up to $1,900 per year by participating? In
effect, is this not really a penalty for not participating? The AARP believes
so. It filed a complaint against the EEOC seeking a preliminary injunction to
stop implementation of the EEOC’s wellness program ADA and GINA rules,
claiming the definition of “voluntary” adopted by the EEOC is inconsistent
with both the ADA and GINA because permitting incentives at up to thirty
percent of the cost of coverage renders the incentives coercive. 201 Although
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia initially denied AARP’s
motion for a preliminary injunction,202 it subsequently ruled that the EEOC
failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision to adopt the thirty
percent incentive levels in both the ADA and GINA rules. 203 It did not vacate
the rules, but remanded them to the EEOC for reconsideration. 204
Put another way, is foregoing the premium discount a “privacy tax?” 205
Fitbit data can reveal a lot of information to an employer:
Impulsivity and the inability to delay gratification—both of which might
be inferred from one’s exercise habits—correlate with alcohol and drug
abuse, disordered eating behavior, cigarette smoking, higher credit-card
debt, and lower credit scores. Lack of sleep—which a Fitbit tracks—has
been linked to poor psychological well-being, health problems, poor
199. H.R. 1313, 115th Cong. (2017).
200. Id. § 3(b).
201. Complaint, AARP v. EEOC, 226 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 16-cv-2113), 2016 WL
6211326.
202. AARP, 226 F. Supp. 3d 7.
203. AARP v. EEOC, No. 16-2113 (JDB), 2017 WL 3614430, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2017)
(“Neither the final rules nor the administrative record contain any concrete data, studies, or analysis that
would support any particular incentive level as the threshold past which an incentive becomes involuntary
in violation of the ADA and GINA.”).
204. Id. at *17 (“[W]hile the Court has serious concerns about the agency’s reasoning regarding the
GINA and ADA rules, these concerns are currently outweighed by the ‘disruptive consequences’ that are
likely to result from vacatur. Assuming that the agency can address the rules’ failings in a timely manner,
vacatur ‘is not the required remedy,’ and would indeed be inappropriate at this time.” (quoting AFL-CIO
v. Chao, 496 F. Supp. 2d 76, 91 (D.D.C. 2007)). AARP has filed a motion with the court requesting that
the rules either be vacated effective January 1, 2018, or their enforcement enjoined, again effective
January 1, 2018, pending the EEOC’s reconsideration of the rules. AARP’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Court’s Aug. 22, 2017 Order, AARP, 2017 WL
3614430
(No.
16-cv-2113
(JDB)),
https://benefitslink.com/src/ctop/AARP_motion-toamend_DDC_08302017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5V9T-5XSQ].
205. See Mark A. Rothstein & Heather L. Harrell, Health Risk Reduction Programs in EmployerSponsored Health Plans: Part I—Efficacy, 51 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 943, 944 (2009)
(suggesting that higher-paid employees can more easily afford to pay a “privacy tax” and not have to
share health information in a wellness program, whereas lower-paid employees may be more
economically vulnerable, and, thus, more likely to feel coerced into signing up to participate; completing
analysis prior to the EEOC’s May 17, 2016 final rules).
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cognitive performance, and negative emotions such as anger, depression,
sadness, and fear. 206

One scholar has questioned whether companies selling Fitbits and
similar wearable technology are in the business of selling devices or in the
business of selling the data those devices generate. 207
[T]he data coming off of sensors are incredibly high quality. I can paint
an incredibly detailed and rich picture of who you are based on your Fitbit
data or any of this other fitness and health data. And that data is so high
quality that I can do things like price insurance premiums or I could
probably evaluate your credit score incredibly accurately. 208

One could easily conclude that the thirty-percent incentives to
participate in “voluntary” wellness programs coerces employees to forego
medical privacy otherwise provided by the ADA and GINA.
IV. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
As noted at the beginning of Part II above, employers have a number of
legitimate business reasons—and, in some cases, legal obligations—to
monitor their workers. Except in extreme cases (or except under Section 7 of
the NLRA as currently applied), employers should have no problems
justifying workplace monitoring, particularly during working hours. But
technology that almost all workers use allows monitoring twenty-four hours
a day, seven days a week. All that data may sometime prove too tempting to
employers, causing them to cross the boundary from monitoring—to watch
or keep track of, usually for a special purpose 209—to snooping—to make a
presumptuous inquiry, especially in a sneaking or meddlesome manner. 210
206. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 119 (2014) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter Peppet, Internet of Things].
207. See Scott Peppet, Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch., Address at the Federal Trade
Commission
Internet
of
Things
Workshop
168
(Nov.
19,
2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/internet-things-privacy-securityconnected-world/final_transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCT2-CYDP].
208. Id. at 169. “Ira Hunt, who is the CIO of the CIA said you can be 100 percent identified, as an
individual, by your Fitbit data. Why? Because no two persons’ gaits or ways of moving are the same. We
can almost always figure out who you are based on that kind of incredibly rich detail.” Id. at 170-71; see
also Brown, supra note 8, at 13 (“The explosive growth of wearable device ownership makes it easier
than ever for employers to collect health and fitness data about their employees.”); Cathy O’Neil, That
Health Tracker Could Cost You, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 23, 2017, 6:30 AM; updated Mar. 8, 2017,
9:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-23/that-free-health-tracker-could-costyou [https://perma.cc/6FUH-6XYE] (“In the short term, there’s more money in profiling people as highrisk or low-risk than there is in solving their actual health problems. Granted, the information people
provide to insurance companies might never be used against them personally. But it could ultimately be
used against people like them.”).
209. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 801 (11th ed. 2011).
210. Id. at 1181. Recall RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.06(b) (AM. LAW INST.
2014): “An intrusion is highly offensive . . . if the nature, manner, and scope of the intrusion are clearly

252

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 93:1

While this article has reviewed laws affecting “traditional” workrelated privacy protections for electronic data and communications, the
growing trend is ever-more powerful devices that can collect and store evermore personal information, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week,
usually intermingled with work-related data and communications. Courts
still apply common law GPS privacy standards under the notion that an
individual driving a car around the streets of a city that has a tracking device
installed in or on the car is not necessarily driving in secluded areas. 211 In the
meantime, individuals can be now identified with high degrees of accuracy
based upon “anonymous” mobility data sets. 212
Massive amounts of data are being collected, juxtaposed with large,
diverse data sets, and processed with mathematical algorithms—all to
determine, say, whether an employee is more likely to be productive or even
remain on the job for a given length of time. 213 Add to this the GPS data
accumulated when employees are required to install a GPS app on their
smartphone—and keep their smartphone turned on 24/7—and the biometric
data accumulated when employees are given a Fitbit along with a substantial
financial incentive to allow their group health insurance provider to track

unreasonable when judged against the employer’s legitimate business interests or the public’s interests in
intruding.”
211. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
212. See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human
Mobility, 3 SCI. REP. 1, 1 (2013) (concluding that their formula for the uniqueness of human mobility
traces represents fundamental constraints to an individual’s privacy); see also Ira S. Rubinstein &
Woodrow Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703, 704-05 (2016) (discussing the risk
to privacy by the failed assumption that data sets are truly anonymized).
213. See Robert Sprague, Welcome to the Machine: Privacy and Workplace Implications of
Predictive Analytics, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12 (2015), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i4/article12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66ES-PXRV]; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3CU-RCD8]; CATHY O’NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS
DEMOCRACY (2016) (revealing that algorithmic models that determine, say, whether someone gets a car
loan or how much they pay for health insurance, are opaque, unregulated, and uncontestable, even when
they’re wrong); Rachel Emma Silverman, Tracking Sensors Invade the Workplace: Devices on Workers,
Furniture Offer Clues for Boosting Productivity, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2013, 11:42 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324034804578344303429080678
[https://perma.cc/67F2-8RTX] (“As Big Data becomes a fixture of office life, companies are turning to
tracking devices to gather real-time information on how teams of employees work and interact. Sensors,
worn on lanyards or placed on office furniture, record how often staffers get up from their desks, consult
other teams and hold meetings.”); see also Timothy L. Fort et al., The Angel on Your Shoulder: Prompting
Employees to Do the Right Thing Through the Use of Wearables, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 139
(2016) (positing that wearable technologies, such as a Fitbit, could be used by employers to “nudge”
employees toward more ethical behaviors); Richards, supra note 2, at 1934 (“The digital technologies
that have revolutionized our daily lives have also created minutely detailed records of those lives.”).
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their vital signs—again, 24/7. 214 Because so many different devices are now
collecting data and are interconnected through the Internet, employers have
access to an abundance of data beyond just Fitbits at work or social media
posts. For example, driving data from a smartphone GPS might provide
inferences about personality and habits; electricity usage may reveal lifestyle
traits, such as how late an employee stays up at night; and smartphone data
may even reveal insights from conversational patterns. 215
All of those data may just prove too tempting for snooping employers.
Meanwhile, most of our privacy laws were adopted well before smartphones
and the Internet became ubiquitous; they still hunt for physical secluded
locations; and, because they are based on reasonable expectations of privacy,
they can easily be circumvented by employer policies that eliminate that
expectation by informing workers they have no right to privacy in the
workplace.
The future—indeed the present—does not bode well for worker
privacy.

214. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 182, at 246 (detailing some of the data risks associated with the
use of Fitbits in wellness programs, including re-identification of anonymous data, inaccurate data due to
employee misuse or device inaccuracy, and interception of sensitive data by hackers).
215. See Peppet, Internet of Things, supra note 206, at 120.

